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Abstract 
 
I argue that state-ownership and state-management of oil on behalf of the Iraqi 
people is not conducive to democracy and inconsistent with the principles of free 
market.  I also argue that it can adversely affect economic development and 
might further impoverish the average Iraqi citizen.  To resolve the problems, this 
note proposes a change to the “political” rules; i.e., change the Iraqi constitution, 
and provides an economic strategy to transfer oil wealth to the Iraqi people.       
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1. Introduction 
 
Iraq’s proven oil reserves exceed 100 billion barrels, and its unproven reserves 
are just as much.  It is well documented that only 15 out of 80 oilfields are in 
production.  Three years after the US invasion and the future of Iraq is uncertain.  
Oil is the main reason of the political wrangling and violence.  Political groups 
have been positioning themselves strategically to control oil wealth. The main 
problem is ownership, which will determine whether Iraq develops into a modern 
democracy, or not. The implications for the rest of the world are obviously 
numerous.  
 
In the past Iraq was a centralized economy with public institutions.  The state’s 
control of oil has given it unlimited powers in the past.  The state derived its 
power from its control over vast oil revenues; it did not need to consult with the 
people on how to spend them.  History taught us that such economies could not 
deliver economic prosperity. And in such economies, impoverished people have 
bigger worries than democracy.    
 
Private ownership is associated with political and economic freedom, See for 
example, Hayek (1944), Friedman (1962), Pipes (2000), and O’Driscoll and 
Hoskibs (2003).  History tells us that development requires free market 
institutions and most importantly private property rights.  There is reliable 
empirical evidence on the significance of private ownership on GDP growth.  For 
example, historians North and Thomas (1973) and Rosenberg and Birdzell 
(1986) presented evidence that private property played a major role in enriching 
the West.   Barro (1991) used proxies for the quality of private property to test the 
effect on GDP growth.  Also Kormendi and MeGuire (1985) used measures of 
political freedom and civil liberties to proxy the quality of property rights and 
reported positive association with GDP growth.  A recent paper by Heitger (2003) 
illustrates the same point. 
 
The Iraqis are poor.  Iraq’s average annual rate of growth of real GDP per capita 
over the period 1950-2003 is -0.10.  If we exclude the period of the Gulf War and 
the UN sanctions from 1991 onward the rate of growth is 1.5.  For Iraq to make 
the transition to democracy and to develop its economy and its people, the 
ownership of oil is an issue that need to be resolved in a manner consistent with 
democratic and free market’s principles.  
 
Privatization of Iraq’s oil has been proposed by some economists; see Wolf 
(2005) for example.  However, there are a few problems that prevent immediate 
privatizations of oil and other assets.  We will argue that although privatization is 
sensible it may not be attainable.2  The objective of this note is to provide an 
alternative strategy such that it is not only consistent with and conducive to 
democracy, but also attainable.  
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 In a well-developed economic model one can probably show that it is an optimal first-best 
solution. 
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The essence of the strategy is gradualism and it covers two phases.  In sections 
2 and 3 we discuss the current situation and the alternative strategy and in 
section 4 we conclude.  
 
2. The current situation 
 
In Iraq’s new constitution Article 109 states,  
 
“Oil and gas is the property of all Iraqi people in all the regions and provinces.” 
 
The constitution acknowledges that oil and gas belong to the Iraqis, but there is a 
wrinkle because Article 110, says,  
 
“The federal government and the governments of the producing regions and 
provinces together will draw up the necessary strategic policies to develop oil 
and gas wealth to bring the greatest benefit for the Iraqi people, relying on the 
most modern techniques of market principles and encouraging investment.”  
 
The constitution implies that the government will control oil revenues and 
redistribute the wealth in a fashion similar to what has been happening in the 
past 85 years or so.  It seems clear that the new constitution maintains the old 
rules under the old assumptions of government agent benevolence and 
omniscience.  Boettke et al. (2006) cite Buchanan (1969, pp. 77-92) who taught 
us to question such assumptions.  The rules of the past Iraqi regimes inhibited 
individual freedom and creativity and eventually were responsible for the 
backwardness of the Iraqi society and its dismal economic performance. 
 
If oil is the property of the Iraqis then the Iraqis must own it directly.  In most 
market-oriented democracies resources and factors of production are expected 
to be owned by the people.3  Almost all the ex – Warsaw Pact countries, which 
became democracies, privatized their economies.  It seems logical that Iraq 
should do the same.  That could be done, for example, by distributing vouchers 
or shares in oil to the Iraqis.  Alaska has a well-known scheme.  However, there 
are a few problems with the immediate transfer of oil wealth to the people:   
 
First is the lack of market-oriented economic institutions.  Second are the decay 
of the infrastructure and the depreciation of physical and human capitals without 
which democracy and development cannot work.  To rebuild them the 
government needs revenues.  But, the main institutions that are typically used to 
finance the budget, which are the tax system and the financial market, are 
themselves dysfunctional and inefficient.  The government will need some 
revenues to provide immediate services and to build the institutions and the 
infrastructure.  
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 Norway is an old democracy, but oil is largely owned by the state.    
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Third, immediate privatization might result in distributional problems.  In Russia, 
for example, the oil industry ended up in the hand of a few with very complicated 
political and economic consequences.  Fourth, Rotunda (2004) suggests that the 
Iraqi people don’t understand capitalism, i.e., the Iraqis are unfamiliar with the 
concept of free market and they are mostly dependent on the state.    
 
For these reasons, at least, a cold-turkey transfer of the ownership of oil assets 
to the people seems problematic in the short run.  It will take time for market 
institutions such as the banking and tax systems to be built.  To deal with the 
timing issue I propose a strategy of gradual transfer of oil wealth to the Iraqi 
people that is consistent with democracy and free market principles, hence 
conducive for development.   
 
3. A proposed alternative strategy 
 
Instead of a cold turkey strategy I propose a two-phase gradual strategy.  In the 
first phase (1) we separate the state from the oil industry completely and 
establish private oil companies; (2) establish the market value of oil assets; (3) 
distribute the oil shares to the Iraqi people; (4) finance some of the budget 
deficits and (5) develop the remaining seventy oilfields and raise oil production to 
6 million barrels a day.  The second phase includes dividends payments to 
shareholders and gradual reduction of the contribution to the budget while 
simultaneously increasing the private ownership of oil to 100 percent.    
 
3.1 Independence 
 
Just like the judiciary and the central bank the oil industry must be independent 
of the state.  This means that all decisions regarding oil are apolitical. This 
independence must also be constitutional.4   
 
I propose immediate establishment of three private regional oil companies, the 
Southern Petroleum Company (SPC); the Northern Petroleum Company (NPC) 
and a Central Petroleum Company (CPC), hence the Iraqi Petroleum Company, 
(IPC).  Evidence from experimental economics suggests that 4 to 5 firms would 
be sufficient to generate a competitive market.   
 
The law states the objectives of the IPC, which are the management of the Iraqi 
oil processes of explorations, developments, productions, sales, exports and the 
revenues, and states its independence.  The government can hire technocrat 
chief executives who are politically neutral.  The CEOs and the government sign 
contracts, which determines the duties, the powers, the governance system – 
e.g., having a board or not, its duties, its members etc. and the form of decision 
making, - e.g., individual decision making, a committee, the makeup of the 
committee, etc., the length of the contracts and anything deemed necessary for 
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 In the future when more oilfields are developed in the west they can establish a fourth company, 
West Petroleum Company (WPC).   
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the CEOs to do the job.   We have a good insight about the optimality of these 
types of contracts in monetary economics and this is not different in my opinion, 
Walsh (1995).  The companies must be transparent and fully accountable.   
 
3.2 Determining the share value 
 
It is important that the IPC manages the privatization process totally 
independently.  The second step in the first phase of the strategy is for the IPC to 
establish the market value of oil assets in Iraq.  There are many ways to do so.  
Finance economists and engineers can work out the discounted present value of 
total oil assets and approximate a sensible value for the share, where every Iraqi 
regardless of religion, sect, and gender is a shareholder in this company.5  
Alternatively, anyone of the companies can go public and an IPO can determine 
the share value.   
 
3.3 Managing the process  
 
Lessons from the privatization experiences of the ex- Warsaw Pact countries are 
important for Iraq.  In the Czech’s Republic case, for example, people rushed into 
selling their shares.  Excess supply of tradable shares caused the price to fall 
and the wealth ended up in the hand of a few wealthy people and organizations.  
Because shares are fully tradable at a market price and because Iraq’s economy 
is weak, the majority of people are unemployed, poor, and desperate for cash, 
many are expected to sale their shares immediately.   
 
To protect people, the process needs to be managed.  The Parliament can 
regulate the process of ownerships, sales, transfer, inheritance etc, e.g., it could 
regulate the number of shares allowed per individual.  Transactions must be 
approved in a court of law such as the financial court, which Iraq established 
recently.  This will protect women, the elderly and sick people from exploitations.  
The share could be divided into n  smaller denominations each of a value n/1 , 
which enables the shareholder to sell a portion of the share and not all of it.  
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 Assuming oil production is 3 million barrels/day and given the market price of oil, a discount rate 
anywhere between 10 and 15 percent, a depreciation rate of 10 percent, cash flow grows at a 
constant rate of 5 percent a year and the cost of oil productions and development 2.5 dollars per 
barrel, I compute P the value of the Iraqi oil industry
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, where C is the cash-
flows and is equal to revenues minus costs including the deprecation rate and required capital 
expenditures, g is the growth rate of cash flow, T is the number of years and r is the discount rate. 
Depending on the how many Iraqis are illegible for shares (e.g., 13 million adults are age 18 and 
over.  Iraqis younger than 18 years should not receive shares to avoid population growth.) one 
can obtain a value up to 90000 US dollars per share.   
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3.4 Financing the budget deficits 
 
The IPC can set aside 50% of total annual revenues for financing the 
government’s budget.  The rest can be (1) reinvested, and (2) sent to a 
stabilization fund to smooth out future oil price changes.  No dividends are paid 
to the people during this period.  The length of this period is likely to be 
determined by many factors some of which are technical such as the adequacy 
of the tax system and the normality of oil production etc, which we will discuss 
next.      
 
3.5 Capital investments and development 
 
Iraq’s oil production has declined to below 3 million barrels a day because of 
sanctions and wars.  Another element of the first phase of the strategy is to 
increase oil production by reviving previous plans to increase Iraq’s oil production 
to 5.5 – 6 million barrels a day.  To do so, capital is needed.  However, the 
methods of finance are controversial.   Estimates of needed capital vary, but 
most experts suggest 25-30 billion dollars.  There are many ways to raise 30 
billion dollars to rebuild the Iraqi oil industry.  
 
The IPC can (1) reinvest its profits gradually; (2) borrow from investments banks 
and international organizations or (3) award limited contracts to international oil 
companies.6 There is an argument that borrowing might be hindered by Iraq’s 
large debt, but this will not apply if IPC is independent of the government.  It 
could borrow and use the huge oil reserves as collateral.7  Borrowing is 
straightforward and there is no sovereignty issue here.   
 
The IPC can invite international oil companies and sign contractual agreements 
such as turn-key and joint ventures.  The independent IPC’s job is to manage the 
Iraq’s oil on behalf of the Iraqis on economic basis just like the constitution stated 
in Article 110 (second), but with replacing the word “government” with the words 
“the independent IPC.”  
 
A sound recommendation surely depends on comparing the cost and benefits of 
each method.  It should be emphasized that any method that surrenders the 
wealth of the Iraqi people to foreign companies or perceived to compromise the 
integrity and sovereignty of Iraq will trigger violent reactions.  The history of Iraq 
is ripe with evidence of such reactions.  Some political factions will exploit these 
issues and create more havoc.  
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 If the IPC borrows 30 billion dollars to be paid over 30 years at 12% annually compounded 
interest, the debt service will amount to less than 2 dollars per barrel per day. 
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 Apparently, this is not what happened when Russia privatized its oil sector.  Foreign companies 
did not immediately jump into Russia’s oil industry because of uncertainties about the economic 
condition and the commitment of the Russians for pursuing free market economics. 
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As a guide, Iraqis need a good understanding of the lessons of the Ex-Warsaw 
Pact privatization experiences and the problems associated with the methods of 
contractual agreements with international oil companies such as Production 
Sharing Agreements.  It is important that the IPC controls the rate of oil 
production.  If the Iraqis lose control over the rate of oil production to foreign 
companies it might soon discover that all their oil has been depleted.  Oil belongs 
to all Iraqis including the unborn.  Foreign contracts should be subject to Iraqi 
laws, present and future and all disputes resolved in Iraqi courts.  That being 
said, negotiations with foreign companies and investments banks require that the 
Iraqi oil companies have a high degree of bargaining power.     
 
3.6 The second phase  
 
The first phase of the strategy ends when all the investments are in place and 
when oil export reaches 6 million barrels a day.  At this stage, the IPC can begin 
a process of paying back dividends to the Iraqis.  Profits from all three companies 
combined are used in the calculation of the dividends.  By this time also one 
would expect the banking system to be functional and most Iraqis will have 
checking accounts.   
 
Gradually, the IPC should reduce its contribution to the budget from 50% and 
simultaneously increase the percentage of dividends to the Iraqis without 
compromising the services programmes.    
 
As the dividends increase and the tax system become functional, the state can 
begin taxing the dividends gradually.  At some point the budget will be entirely 
financed by non-oil revenues and the Iraqis own their entire oil wealth.  Note also 
that the government can at this point or even earlier, borrow from the public; i.e., 
sell bonds to finance the deficits.   
 
I predict that this strategy will have stabilizing effects.  The people will recognize 
the good intention of the government.  This empowers the government.  The 
strategy will enhance democratic practices and contributes to the building of free 
market institutions such as the banking system, the tax system, the share 
market, the post office, etc that are required to achieve efficiency in the 
distribution of wealth.  The incentive system will be set properly such that 
resource allocation becomes optimal and economic efficiency increases over 
time.  It took New Zealand about 15 years to realize the fruits of its market-
oriented policy reforms of the 1980s.     
 
When Iraqis begin to receive dividends from oil shares they will become more 
interested in the performance of the oil industry as a whole regardless of the 
regions because when any one regional company makes profits all Iraqis will 
benefit.  This kind of privatization and the independence of the oil business will 
unify the country as the people of Iraq will recognize that they own and share 
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their country.  It might also eliminate the need for federalism.   Regional oil 
companies will also invest in their regions. 
 
Private property laws reduce corruption and thus, increase potential growth.   
The strategy will make the Iraqis rich.  There is evidence about the negative 
correlation between corruption and economic growth, for example see, Chafuen 
and Guzman (1996).  High expected rate of repudiation makes corruption more 
possible.  The number of Private individuals who bribe government officials 
increases in order to have their contracts honoured.   Iraq is one of the worst 
countries in the world in terms of freedom from repudiation of contracts.  Iraq also 
scored high on almost all corruption indices, Easterly (2002).   
 
Private ownership and allowing Iraqis to hold shares in their own oil industry is 
also consistent with Islam.  Interest rate is forbidden in Islam.  But Muslims are 
encouraged to invest in stocks and equity so they share the gains and losses.     
 
The Iraqi shareholders will benefit when the IPC, or any regional company, does 
well and the share price increases.  However, if the new government of Iraq 
elects to pursue the old policies and keeps control over oil it will sooner or later 
become another authoritarian government and economic development will stall.   
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Previous Iraqi governments were powerful because they controlled oil wealth.  
They did not need to consult with the Iraqis on how the revenues are spent.  
Under those governments Iraq was a centralized economy with a dominant 
public sector.  Those public institutions were inefficient and inhibited individuals’ 
freedom and creativity.  Iraq’s economy was weak and the average Iraqi was 
poor relative to many others.  It is puzzling that the new Iraqi constitution (articles 
109 and 110) is still inconsistent with the principles of democracy and maintains 
the same rules of the past.  It is believed that it is not conducive to economic 
development because it does not guarantee the transfer of oil wealth from the 
state to the Iraqis, which will inhibit economic freedom and creativity.   
 
This paper argues that articles 109 and 110 of Iraq’s new constitution must be 
changed such that oil wealth is redistributed to the Iraqi people.  The new Iraq 
must have new institutions that guarantee economic freedom.  Further, I propose 
a two-phase strategy that gradually returns oil wealth to the Iraqi people.  In the 
first phase, (1) three independent (from the government) private oil companies 
are established.  (2) Total oil assets are evaluated and share value is computed 
and shares are distributed to the Iraqi people.  (3) Oil production is increased to 6 
million barrels a day.  (4) Also, the IPC finances 50 percent of the budget to 
rebuild the infrastructure and free market institutions such as the tax system and 
the banking and financial market.   
 
 8 
In the second phase the oil company gradually reduces the contribution to the 
federal budget and in the same time increases private ownership of oil, and pays 
dividends to the Iraqi people.  By the end of this phase the Iraqi government must 
have a functional tax system that finances the federal budget. 
 
I predict that within a decade this setup will create a new Iraqi economy 
comparative with the rest of the democratic world.  Also, it will unite the Iraqi 
people.  Once the Iraqis realize that the benefits of oil are theirs they will support 
their government.  Also, the world will be better off with a democratic Iraq and 
when decisions about its oil are apolitical and consistent with free market 
principles. 
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